André Gallois' obituary.

André Gallois' main areas of interest are metaphysics (particularly the metaphysics of time and identity), philosophy of mind and epistemology. He has authored two books: Occasions of Identity on problems about persistence and identity, and The World Without the Mind Within on issues about self-knowledge. In addition, he has published a number of journal articles on a wide range of issues including: Free Agency, Newcomb's Problem, Berkeley, Scepticism, the Cogito, Introspection, Perception and the Philosophy of Time. He has been the recipient of a research grant from the Arts and Humanities Research Board, and has contributed articles on the de re/de dicto distinction and on sense data to the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Books

Articles

‘The Fixity of Reasons,’ Philosophical Studies 146 (2) (2009).

‘Consciousness, Reasons, and Moore’s Paradox’ in Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person (eds.) M. Green & J. N. Williams (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2007), pp. 165-88.

‘Identity Over Time.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005).

‘Comments on Ted Sider: Four Dimensionalism,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3) (2004), pp. 648–657.

‘Langford and Ramachandran on Occasional Identities.’ Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204) (2001), pp. 378-385.

‘The Indubitability of the Cogito,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (4) (2000), pp. 363–384.

‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1) (1998), pp. 263–283.

‘Can an Anti-Realist Live with the Past?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3) (1997), pp. 288 – 303.

'Deflationary Self-Knowledge' in Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind (eds.) M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994), pp. 49-63.

‘Asymmetry in Attitudes and the Nature of Time,’ Philosophical Studies 76 (1) (1994).

‘Is Global Scepticism Self-Refuting?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1) (1993), pp. 36 – 46.

‘Ramachandran on Restricting Rigidity,’ Mind 102 (405) (1993), pp. 151-155.

‘Reply to Ramachandran,’ Mind 102 (405) (1993), pp. 159-162.

‘Occasional Identity,’ Philosophical Studies 58 (3) (1990).

‘Carter on Contingent Identity and Rigid Designation,’ Mind 97 (386) (1988), pp. 273-278.

‘Rigid Designation and the Contingency of Identity,’ Mind 95 (377) (1986), pp. 57-76.

‘Would It Have Been Me?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3) (1984), pp. 292 – 293 (with Robert Elliot).

‘True Believers and Radical Sceptics,’ Philosophia 14 (3-4) (1984), pp. 349-368.

‘Van Inwagen on Free Will and Determinism,’ Philosophical Studies 32 (July) (1977), pp. 99-105.

‘Berkeley’s Master Argument,’ Philosophical R