Hille Paakkunainen works in Metaethics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Action. Most of her work thus far concerns the nature of various normative phenomena, such as having a good reason for doing something, or being justified in believing something; and the relationship between such phenomena and forms of reasoning or agency. She is also interested in how such normative phenomena fit into a naturalistic understanding of the world.

Epistemic Authority without Instrumentalism. Forthcoming in Inquiry, Symposium on Nathaniel Sharadin’s book Epistemic Instrumentalism Explained.

Metanormative Constructivism as Non-Reductive Perspectivalism. In The Future of Normativity, ed. Kirchin, S. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2025). https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198927761.003.0009

The Normative-Explanatory Nexus and the Nature of Reasons. Jurisprudence 15(1): 77-95 (2024).
https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2023.2297582

Practical Inferences. In Agency, Norms, Inquiry, and Artifacts: Essays in Honor of Risto Hilpinen.
Eds. Paul McNamara, Mark Brown, and Andrew Jones. Springer (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-9ract0749-5_10

Rationality and Supervenience: A Comment on Broome (and Lord). Australasian Philosophical Review Vol. 4 Issue 4 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1080/24740500.2021.1964238

Doubts about “Genuinely Normative” Epistemic Reasons. In Metaepistemology, ed. Whiting, D., Way, J. & McHugh, C. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019).https://global.oup.com/academic/product/metaepistemology-9780198805366?cc=us&lang=en&

Doing Away with the “Shmagency” Objection to Constitutivism. Manuscrito 41 (4):431-480 (2018). Special issue on Agency & Rationality, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum & David Horst. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.hp

The “Just Too Different” Objection to Normative Naturalism. Philosophy Compass 13 (2):1-13 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12473

Internalism and Externalism about Reasons. In The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, ed. Daniel Star. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018). https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-reasons-and-normativity-9780199657889?cc=us&lang=en&

Can There Be Government House Reasons for Action? Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 12:56-93 (2017). https://doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v12i1.213